NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON DECENTRALISATION AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNANCE

25-26 SEPTEMBER 2025

KEMPINSKI HOTEL, ACCRA

THEME: RESETTING DECENTRALISATION FOR RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY

TOPIC: USING THE PAST TO INFORM THE FUTURE: RESETTING DECENTRALISATION FOR RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY: POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVES

By

Professor Kwamena Ahwoi

Former Minister of Local Government and Rural Development

THE PAST

1951 and All That —–

Ghana’s decentralization past began in 1951 with the enactment of the Local Government Ordinance1 by the first all-Gold Coast Legislative Council under the 1951 Coussey Constitution. The Local Authorities established under the Ordinance comprised two-thirds membership elected by universal adult suffrage and one-third made up of unelected chiefs and traditional authorities. They functioned as decentralized local authorities of the de-concentration type and remained in existence until 1961.

The 1957 Independence Constitution

The 1957 Independence Constitution sought to introduce a regional level type of decentralization of the devolution type. The 5 regions in existence at the time namely Western, Eastern. Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Trans-Volta Togoland were each to have Regional Assemblies with extensive powers in specified sectors2. The provisions on Regional Assemblies were however repealed by the CPP Government in 1958 and with that, the intended experiment with regional decentralization by devolution never saw the light of day.

Local Government under the 1960 First Republican Constitution

The 1960 First Republican Constitution was silent on Local Government, but the number of regions was increased from 5 to 8 with the creation of the Central, Brong Ahafo and Upper Regions. A Local Government Act was however enacted in 19613 which introduced a de-concentrated local government system. The adoption of the one-party state in 1964 resulted in the establishment of a centralized governance system and greatly reduced the powers of the Local Authorities.

Local Government under the National Liberation Council (NLC)

Following the coup d’état of 1966 which overthrew the CPP Government and replaced it with the National Liberation Council (NLC), the Local Authorities were dissolved and the districts were put under the administration of District Administrative Officers, who were civil servants.

Local Government in the Second Republic

The NLC constitutionally transferred power to the Progress Party (PP) Government in 1969 and that Government enacted the Local Administration Act4 of 1971. That Government lasted for only a little over two years and was therefore not able to implement the Act.

Local Government under the National Redemption Council (NRC)/Supreme Military Council (SMC)

Implementation of the 1971 Local Administration Act was therefore left to the military government that overthrew the Progress Party Government in 1972, the National Redemption Council (NRC). This was done through the enactment of a Local Administration (Amendment) Decree, 1974. That Decree provided for regional and district level decentralization by devolution to the district level, but that effort was hampered by the fact that the district political structures established for decentralization were undemocratic in the sense that they were composed of two-thirds members appointed  by the Central Government (the NRC) and one-third made up of unelected chiefs and traditional authorities.

Administrative decentralization was however given a major fillip with the District Councils made responsible for specified sectors under the same Local Administration (Amendment) Decree, 19745.

Another major administrative structural change was the integration of the Civil Service and the Local Government Service into one Civil Service. But this change nearly sounded the death knell of local government as the sector lost its unique brand as a service for local people and was subsumed under the central governance system.

It was also in this era of supposed decentralization that moves were successfully made to re-centralise even further functions which had been performed with moderate success by the Local Authorities. For example, the Omnibus Services (Amendment) Decree, 19736 as amended by the Omnibus Services (Amendment) Decree, 19727, removed responsibility for the provision of intra-city transport from the District Councils and vested it in a newly-created, centralized Omnibus Services Authority.

Similarly, the Ghana Education Service (Amendment) Decree, 19768, removed Education from the list of decentralised District Departments and vested the responsibility for primary and secondary education in the centralized Ghana Education Service.

In 1978, local government elections were held for the first time in about 15 years under the Government of SMC II. It recorded the lowest turn-out in the history of local government elections in Ghana – about 18 per cent.

Local Government in the Third Republic

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Government which overthrew the SMC II Government on June 4th, 1979, handed over power to the Peoples National Party (PNP) Government in September 1979. The PNP Government enacted the Local Government (Amendment) Act of 19809. Before the Act could be put to the test, the PNP Government was overthrown on 31st December 1981 and the Government of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was established in its stead.

Local Government and Decentralisation under the PNDC

Without a doubt, the golden age of decentralisation in Ghana has occurred under the PNDC administration and the Fourth Republic. But the beginning of the PNDC era itself appeared ominous for the future of democratic decentralisation in Ghana when all the District Councils elected under the SMC II administration were dissolved in March 1982 and replaced WITH Interim Management Committees under the Local Government (Interim Administration) Law, 198210. There was however a glimmer of hope for the14 future of decentralisation when two additional regions were created by the PNDC – the Greater Accra Region11 in 1982 and the Upper West Region12 in 1983, bringing the total number of regions to 10.

Decentralisation received a new lease of life when the PNDC issued its Policy Guidelines13 in May 1982 in which it made a renewed commitment to decentralisation. Implementation of the Policy Guidelines gained momentum when a 27-member PNDC-appointed “Akuse Group” presented its report on “District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections”, popularly known as the “Blue Book” in 1987. The report gave birth to today’s District Assemblies after its contents were converted into the Local Government Law of 198814.

The novelty features of the Blue Book and the 1988 Local Government Law to allow for true local level democracy, participation and representation included the following:

 

    • Local Government elections would be conducted on a non-partisan basis;

    •  Illiterates in English could contest Local Government elections;

    • Candidates for Local Government elections did not have to pay deposits;

    • Candidates for Local Government elections would have to be “ordinarily resident” in their electoral areas;

    • The entire cost of Local Government elections would be underwritten by the state;

    • Local languages could be used in the proceedings of the Local Authorities.

Following the promulgation of the Local Government Law of 1988, the first District Level Elections were conducted between November 1988 and January 1989 and the pioneer District Assemblies and Unit Committees were inaugurated in March 1989.

THE PRESENT

Landmark Local Government Activities in the Fourth Republic

Following the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, the 1988 Local Government Law was revised and aligned with the Constitution’s provisions on Decentralisation and Local Government, resulting in the enactment of a new Local Government Act of 199315.

Landmark enactments to push the decentralisation agenda forward after the enactment of the 1993 Local Government Act included the following:

 

    • District Assemblies Common Fund Act, 1993, Act 455;

    • National Development Planning Commission Act, 199416;

    • National Development Planning (System) Act, 199417;

    • Institute of Local Government Studies Act, 200318;

    • Local Government Service Act, 200319.

In 2016, these various disparate legislations on local government and decentralisation were consolidated into the Local Governance Act20.

Alongside these legislations, the following activities and events also took place to propel the decentralisation agenda:

 

    • Establishment of the Institute of Local Government Studies in 1998;

    • The de-coupling of the Civil Service and the Local Government Service in 2010;

    • The operationalization of the Local Government Service in 2010;

    • The formulation of the National Decentralisation Policy Framework (NDPF) I and the National Decentralisation Action Plan (NDAP) I  (2010-2014);

    • The establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMCC) on Decentralisation;

    • The establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee (IMCC) on Decentralisation in 2010;

    • The formulation of the NDPF II and the NDAP II (2015-2019);

    • The formulation of the National Decentralisation Policy and Strategy 2020-2024;

    • The creation of 6 additional regions namely Ahafo, Bono East, North East, Oti, Savannah and Western North Regions, bringing the total number of regions to 16 in 2018-2019;

    • The periodic creation of new districts, bringing the total number of districts to today’s 261.

These frenetic activities and events have translated into various imperatives of Ghana’s decentralisation, including political, administrative, planning, fiscal, economic development, popular participation and inter-sectoral coordination. My topic today however restricts me to only three of these imperatives namely political decentralisation, administrative decentralisation, and economic development, and I intend to respect that restriction.

Political Decentralisation Imperatives

The key issue under political decentralisation is constitutional. The 1992 Constitution does not define “decentralisation”, and yet decentralisation can mean either de-concentration, devolution, delegation or public-private partnerships with different consequences for each selected meaning. This failure of the Constitution has made decentralisation implementation under the Constitution very difficult.

Other key issues under the political decentralisation imperative include the optimum number of regions and districts that may be created; the categorisation of the districts into metropolises, municipalities and districts; whether the local government system should be partisan or non-partisan; whether MMDCEs should be elected, appointed or appointed with the prior approval of the MMDAs; participatory governance at the local level; the issue of checks and balances at the local level; and the issue of the political driver of decentralisation at the national level.

Administrative Decentralisation Imperatives

The administrative decentralisation imperative raises issues of the provision of skills and competences at the local level, including issues of recruitment, training and transfers; the functions and powers to be transferred from the Central Government to the Local Governments; the Departments and organisations to be established as Departments of the MMDAs; ensuring compliance with the constitutional imperative in Article 240 (2) (d) which requires that “as far as practicable, persons in the service of local government shall be subject to the effective control of local authorities”; and the mandate and future of the Local Government Service in relation to the provision of the human resources of the MMDAs.

Economic Development Imperatives

The fundamental issue under the economic development imperative is whether the MMDAs should be active operators in economic development activities or whether they should act as facilitators, creating the enabling environment for local entrepreneurs to play the lead role in economic development activities. Once that question is answered, then the subsidiary issues of how to promote economic development; how to financially capacitate local entrepreneurs; andwhat kind of activities are suited for which localities, can all be addressed.

I will address the issues raised by these three decentralisation imperatives by keeping faith with my assigned topic which requires me to “use the past to inform the future”.

THE FUTURE

“Using the Past to inform the Future”:  Political Decentralisation

First, the current Constitutional Review Committee should take advantage of its mandate and, based on the work already done by the 2010 Professor Albert Fiadjoe Constitution Review Commission21, define “decentralisation” in the Constitution. My own view is that all three senses of “decentralisation” are used in the Constitution, with de-concentration at the regional level, devolution at the district level, and delegation at the sub-district level.

Second, it is my view that we have already exceeded the optimum number of regions and districts that the country needs. For a period of about 50 years, the country survived with a maximum of 10 regions. Creating 6 new regions in only 2 years (2018-2019) was definitely an over-reach with no tangible benefits to show for it.  For districts, it is obvious that our Presidents have not kept faith with the population thresholds required for the creation of districts contained in the Local Government Act of 1993 and the Local Governance Act of 2016 and have only done so for purely partisan political reasons. The result is the current excessive number of 261 districts, many of which are non-viable and many of which cannot be used for planning purposes, a key rationale for the creation of districts. In short, many of today’s districts are not “fit for purpose”, a development that the Report of the Justice Siriboe Commission of Enquiry into Electoral and Local Government Reform warned against after the overthrow of the CPP Government in 1966.

Third, the bases for the categorisation of districts into metropolises, municipalities and districts has similarly been abused. That is how come metropolises have increased from 3 in 1993 to 6 today and municipalities have grown exponentially from 4 in 1993 to more than 70 today. It is also important that specific attributes of the specific categories are spelt out in the law.

Fourth, for now, I would recommend that the local government system should remain non-partisan. It has worked well for us in the Fourth Republic and enabled us to avoid, at the local level, the extreme polarisation and violence that have afflicted our national level governance architecture. It has also enabled us to pursue local level development devoid of partisan considerations.

Fifth, I am also of the view that the MMDAs should continue to be a hybrid of elected and appointed members, even though there would appear to be a case for removing the appointment power from the President and vesting it in the chiefs and traditional authorities as was the case in the pre-1988 Local Government system. The current system under which the President appoints the 30 per cent of the membership of the MMDAs has the effect of loading the Assemblies with partisan representatives of the President’s party and therefore detracting from the supposed non-partisanship of the Assemblies.

Sixth, even though public opinion seems to overwhelmingly be in favour of the election of MMDCEs, I am of the view that for as long as the current governance architecture of the country remains one of a partisan central government superimposed on a non-partisan local government system with the partisan central government required to implement its plans and programmes through the non-partisan local governments, the current situation of MMDCEs appointed by the President with the prior approval of the MMDAs should remain. That architecture requires that the President has an important voice in the corridors of the MMDAs.

Seventh, participatory governance at the local level as contained in the 2016 Local Governance Act22 should not only be maintained; it should be strengthened. Experience teaches that decentralisation that is not implemented through democratic and participatory structures and processes often ends in failure. This is the lesson that we have learnt from the failure of the 1974 NRC decentralisation reforms.

Eighth is the issue of checks and balances at the local level, and here I can do no better than quote from my own book: “Local Government and Decentralisation in Ghana”23, a quotation that is based on my past personal experiences as Minister of Local Government for 12 years: “One of the myths of decentralisation is that the people at the national governance centre are bad and the people at the local level are good, so that once you decentralise, all the country’s problems of public administration are solved. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the centralised system of government, the people at the local level appear to be good because they are never given the opportunity to be bad. But once functions and powers and means and resources are transferred to the people at the local level, the opportunities are created for the people at the local level to be bad or even worse under decentralisation. [One of the reasons is that] under centralisation, normally there is opportunity for only one person to be bad. But once the functions and resources are transferred to 261 different local authority centres, 261 opportunities are created for the people at the local level to be bad. 261 opportunities are created to abuse and misuse powers; and 261 opportunities are created to be “cronyistic” and nepotistic in making appointments to positions. An effective system of checks and balances is therefore a sine qua non to effective decentralisation23.

For these reasons, we need a court in every district, a CHRAJ in every district, an Audit Service office in every district, and an NCCE in every district. These should be in addition to the split position of the Presiding Member and the MMDCE, the power given to the MMDAs to pass a vote of no confidence in the MMDCE and in the electorate to revoke the mandate of an elected Assembly member.

Finally under political decentralisation is the important matter of the location of responsibility for decentralisation implementation at the national level. The political driver of decentralisation at the national level is a very sensitive issue because decentralisation involves the whittling down of the powers of the central political and bureaucratic classes. Whoever calls the decentralisation shots must therefore be somebody with sufficient political clout to command obedience to instructions that are necessary to get policy decisions on decentralisation implemented.

In Ghana, responsibility for decentralisation implementation had been located in the Ministry of Local Government from the beginning of the programme in 1988 until 2010. As a sector Ministry, it was very difficult for the Minister of Local Government to get his colleague Ministers to “obey” the “instructions” necessary for decentralisation to be effectively implemented. The National Decentralisation Policy Framework of 2010 therefore provided for the establishment of the IMCC chaired by the President of the Republic to take over responsibility for decentralisation implementation. The results were spectacular and between 2010 and 2014, the IMCC successfully implemented some of the most difficult and intractable decentralisation choices.

The IMCC has now been mainstreamed into the country’s governance architecture and is provided for in the Local Governance Act of 2016. Because of my personal experience as the longest-serving Minister of Local Government for 12 years who also kick-started the decentralisation programme in 1988, and because of the difficulties I faced in overseeing decentralisation implementation, I have become very passionate about the IMCC and feel compelled to recommend that it should now be elevated into a constitutional provision, an assignment that is squarely within the remit of the Constitutional Review Committee.

“Using the Past to inform the Future”: Administrative Decentralisation

Under administrative decentralisation, the basic skills and competences required for the local authorities are informed by the Departments of the MMDAs required to be established under the Local Governance Act of 2016. These would now include public administrators, finance personnel. educationists, agriculturists, physical and spatial planners, development planners, social welfare officers, engineers, environmentalists, foresters, Game and Wildlife Officers, disaster prevention and mitigation managers, transport managers, human resource managers, lawyers, vital statistics registrants and statisticians. Local government training institutions and organisations are therefore required to concentrate on the training of these categories of professionals.

Second, the transfer of functions and powers is linked to the Departments required to be established by the MMDAs. These are contained in section 78 and the Second to Fourth Schedules of the Local Governance Act, 2016.

Third, the non-decentralisation by devolution of the Ghana Education Service and the Ghana Health Service means that Ghana’s decentralisation programme still remains an unfinished business. This is because the decentralisation principle of subsidiarity requires that decision-making functions in respect of matters that are closest to the people and best performed at the local level must be taken away from the national capital and transferred to the areas where such decisions are implemented. Education and Health are the two sectors that are closest to the people, that impact virtually every person, and that are therefore best implemented at the local level by the local authorities.

Fourth is the constitutional imperative that “as far as practicable, persons in the service of local government must be subject to the effective control of the local authorities”. What this means is that staff of the MMDAs and their decentralised Departments must be subject to the effective control of the MMDAs. This imperative is yet to be fully realised.

To realise this imperative, we must throw the searchlight on the mandate of the Office of the Head of Local Government Service. Once that is done, it becomes obvious that the present situation under which the Office of the Head of Local Government Service is responsible for the recruitment, promotion, discipline and transfer of staff of the MMDAs cannot be a permanent feature of our decentralised local government system because it goes against the grain of the constitutional injunction that “persons in the service of local government must be subject to the effective control of local authorities”.

The Local Governance Act, 2016, itself recognises the temporary nature of these powers of the Office of the Head of Local Government Service when it provides in section 76 (2) that “until legislation provides for the appointment of the staff of the District Assembly, the staff of the District Assembly shall be appointed by the Head of the Local Government Service”. Similarly, section 79 (2) provides that: “Unless legislation provides for the appointment of the staff of the District Assembly by the District Assembly, the staff of the Departments of the District Assembly shall be appointed by the Head of the Local Government Service in consultation with the Public Services Commission”.

What these provisions imply is that the Office of the Head of Local Government Service is exercising powers which are temporary and that the Office must therefore be preparing to relinquish those powers at some point in the future when “legislation provides” otherwise, and preparing the MMDAs to be able to “hire and fire” their own staff. At that point, the Office of the Head of Local Government Service will be restricted to its core functions of policy planning, monitoring, evaluation and standard-setting.

“Using the Past to inform the Future”: Economic Development

With regards to economic development, my view is that MMDAs should act more as facilitators than active economic operators. This is based on our country’s experience with state-owned enterprises at the national level where they became more of resource guzzlers than profit-making enterprises. To create the needed enabling environment, MMDAs should encourage participatory planning at the local level and should also conduct planning hearings at the district and sub-district levels. This will enable the local inhabitants be aware of the available resources, available opportunities and what economic openings exist into which they can tap. MMDAs should also ensure that the district composite budgets reflect the prioritised planning needs of the local people.

Secondly, MMDAs should ensure the implementation of the Local Economic Development (LED) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) policies and legislation at the district level for economic growth, employment creation and income generation.

Thirdly, MMDAs should deepen consultations on local economic development with the local inhabitants and publicise fee-fixing resolutions on a timely basis.

Fourthly, MMDAs should actively encourage local companies and contractors to bid for and win MMDA contracts.

Fifth, MMDAs should promote inter-district trade and commerce in goods and services and harmonise and resolve the multiple taxes on the same goods and services.

Sixth, it would help if MMDAs would pave or concrete all major markets in the country and those in the district capitals in particular.

Conclusion: Some Fiscal Decentralisation Imperatives

I will end with a few comments on fiscal decentralisation which, though not part of my topic, are intrinsically linked with the subject of the economic development imperative. It is my contention that the District Assemblies Common Fund constitutionally belongs to the MMDAs so we should let the MMDAs have all of their monies.

It is my further contention that all bodies external to the MMDAs that are sponging on the District Assemblies Common Fund must be cut off, otherwise the constitutionality of their benefiting from the Common Fund must be tested in the Supreme Court.

We must capacitate the MMDAs to collect the income tax of economic operators in the informal sector as stipulated in the Local Governance Act, 201624.

Finally, we must expand the internally-generated funds base of the MMDAs by the Central Government assigning some of its tax and other revenue sources to the MMDAs.

I thank you for your attention.

NOTES

 

    1. Local Government Ordinance, Cap. 64

    1. The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957 (Independence Constitution), Article 64 (2). The specified sectors were Local Government, Agriculture, Animal Health and Forestry, Education, Communications, Medical and Health Services, Public Works, Town and Country Planning, Housing and Police.

    1. Act 54

    1. Act 359 of 1971

    1. NRCD 258. The specified sectors were Agriculture, Administration, Treasury, Education, Survey and Town Planning, Social Welfare and Community Development, Public Health, Engineering, Fire Service and Sports.

    1. NRCD 71

    1. NRCD 181

    1. SMCD 63

    1. Act 403

    1. PNDCL 14

    1. Greater Accra Region Law, PNDCL 26

    1. Regions of Ghana (Amendment) Law, PNDCL 41

    1. PNDC Policy Guidelines for Ministries and Regional Organisations

    1. PNDCL 207

    1. Act 462

    1. Act 479

    1. Act 480

    1. Act 647

    1. Act 656

    1. Act 936

    1. Constitution Review Commission of Inquiry, 2010, C.I. 64

    1. Act 936, sections 40-48

    1. Kwamena Ahwoi: Local Government and Decentralisation in Ghana (Second Edition), 2017. Published by Winmat Publishers Limited, Chapter 12, page 158

    1. Local Governance Act, 2016, Act 936, section 142 (1) and the Twelfth Schedule                                                                                      

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